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Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care Organizations 
to Avoid Antitrust Challenges 
Tara Adams Ragone 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Faced with increasingly inefficient, costly, poor quality, 
fragmented medical care for their citizens,1 several states are 
adopting accountable care organization (ACO) models of care 
delivery to improve access to quality health care while trying to bend 
the cost curve.2  ACOs are not one-size-fits-all delivery systems, 
 
 J.D., New York University School of Law; Research Fellow & Lecturer in Law, 
Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, Seton Hall University School of 
Law.  The author was a member of a working group in New Jersey that collaborated 
to identify issues to assist the State in its drafting of regulations to implement its 
Medicaid Accountable Care Organization (ACO) legislation, which is the focus of 
this article.  The author is indebted to the members of the working group for their 
insights on antitrust and other matters, especially John V. Jacobi, Dorothea Dix 
Professor of Health Law and Policy at Seton Hall Law School, who provided essential 
guidance throughout the researching and drafting of this article; Elizabeth G. Litten, 
Partner, Fox Rothschild LLP; and Naomi Wyatt, Director of Legal and Governmental 
Affairs, Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers.  Thomas L. Greaney, Co-
Director, Center for Health Law Studies, and Chester A. Myers Professor of Law, St. 
Louis University School of Law, also generously shared his deep expertise in antitrust 
matters.  John Barry and Jonathan Keller, Seton Hall University School of Law Class 
of 2013, provided helpful research assistance in preparation to present this topic at 
the Law Review’s Symposium in Fall 2011.   
 1  See JAMES C. COSGROVE, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-291R, 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: STAKEHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVES DIFFERED ON THE ADEQUACY 
OF GUIDANCE FOR COLLABORATION AMONG HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 1 (Mar. 16, 2012), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589393.pdf [hereinafter “GAO”]. 
 2  See, e.g., TRICIA MCGINNIS & DAVID MARC SMALL, CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE 
STRATEGIES, INC., POLICY BRIEF: ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDICAID: 
EMERGING PRACTICES TO GUIDE PROGRAM DESIGN 1 (Feb. 2012), available at 
http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/Creating_ACOs_in_Medicaid.pdf (noting that ACOs 
“are gaining momentum in Medicaid”); ANN MARIE MARCIARILLE ET AL., BERKELEY L. 
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON L. & SOC. POLICY, POLICY BRIEF: BREAKING DOWN 
BARRIERS TO CREATING SAFETY-NET ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: STATE 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY ISSUES 16–19 (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/chefs/FINAL_assembled_SafetyNetACO.0817-
1.pdf (describing accountable care-related reform efforts in California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, 
New York, Vermont, and Washington); KITTY PURINGTON ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. FOR 
STATE HEALTH POLICY, ON THE ROAD TO BETTER VALUE: STATE ROLES IN PROMOTING 
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however, and states are testing different models to see what works 
best for their needs.3  Some states are focusing their efforts on 
developing Medicaid ACOs, which may “offer a useful framework 
through which payers, providers, and communities can radically 
restructure care delivery to improve care for low-income patients and 
reduce system costs.”4 
New Jersey is on the forefront of state efforts to develop safety 
net ACOs to provide essential health care to their most vulnerable 
populations.  On August 18, 2011, New Jersey enacted the Medicaid 
Accountable Care Organization Demonstration Project.5  Although 
this pilot project shares some features with other ACOs developed at 
the state and national level, it has been described as “unique in its 
ground-up, community-based approach”6 pursuant to which a single 
ACO serves a defined geographic area.  While this approach brings 
the community together to address entrenched, systemic 
fragmentation, the degree of market share and collaboration among 
potential competitors raises antitrust concerns.7 
This Article explores two possible responses to these antitrust 
concerns: (1) clinical integration and (2) the state action doctrine.  
New Jersey is presently drafting regulations to implement its 
demonstration project.  By structuring Medicaid ACOs to reflect 
these doctrines, the State should be able to mitigate anticompetitive 
threats and avoid federal antitrust liability.  Failure to do so, however, 
could jeopardize the success of the pilot because providers are less 
inclined to seek to form an ACO if they face potential or even 
uncertain antitrust liability.8  ACOs and antitrust regulation share the 
 
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS, (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report
/2011/Feb/On%20the%20Road%20to%20Better%20Value/1479_Purington_on_th
e_road_to_better_value_ACOs_FINAL.pdf (examining the development of ACO 
models in Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, 
and Washington “to promote better value in health care spending”). 
 3  CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 1.   
 4  Id. at 1 (outlining essential requirements for safety-net ACOs and reviewing 
Medicaid-focused ACO programs in process throughout the country, including 
Colorado, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and Utah). 
 5  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4D-8.1–8.15.  
 6  CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 7. 
 7  This Article focuses on federal antitrust law because New Jersey exempted 
activities undertaken pursuant to the Medicaid ACO demonstration from State 
antitrust laws.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.1(g). 
 8  See, e.g., Jonathan M. Grossman, et al., Alert: House Judiciary Hearing Provides Few 
Answers, HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST AND LEGISLATIVE UPDATE (Cozen O’Connor), Dec. 
13, 2010, http://www.cozen.com/admin/files/publications/antitrust-121310.pdf 
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common goal of controlling costs while improving quality, and thus 
New Jersey should be able to harmonize its pilot with antitrust 
principles. 
II. OVERVIEW OF NEW JERSEY’S MEDICAID ACO LEGISLATION 
New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO demonstration project, which 
garnered support from a broad coalition of businesses, hospitals, 
healthcare providers, and consumer groups, is a three-year pilot to 
test multi-stakeholder, geographic-based Medicaid ACOs.9  The 
statutory aims include increasing access to care while improving 
health outcomes and quality, as measured by objective metrics and 
patient experience of care, and reducing unnecessary care.10  
Participating providers will continue to receive Medicaid fee-for-
service or managed care reimbursements for their professional 
services.11  As an incentive to coordinate care, the ACO will be eligible 
to share in any savings that it generates above a certain threshold, if it 
meets certain quality benchmarks.12 
The statute establishes several eligibility requirements.13  A non-
profit coalition of providers from a given geographic area, with a 
governing board that includes community input, will apply to the 
State for recognition as a Medicaid ACO.14  To ensure regional 
collaboration, each ACO’s application must have the support of one 
hundred percent of the general hospitals and at least seventy-five 
percent of the primary care providers within the ACO’s designated 
area.15  Although participating providers may collaborate with other 
ACOs,16 only one Medicaid ACO is permitted in each geographic 
area.17  The statute requires each ACO to submit quality improvement 
 
(reporting that health care providers recently testified before Congress “that clear 
guidance from federal agencies is urgently required to reduce the cost, complexity, 
and uncertainty that have stymied ACO formation to date and impede potential 
participants’ willingness to join these organizations in the future”).  
 9   Research and Advocacy: Medicaid ACO Demonstration Projects, CAMDEN COALITION 
OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, http://www.camdenhealth.org/data-research/medicaid-
acos-in-nj/. 
 10  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.1(d); CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES, supra note 2, 
at 15. 
 11  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4D-8.1(f), 8.12. 
 12  See § 30:4D-8.5. 
 13  §§ 30:4D-8.4–8.5. 
 14  §§ 30:4D-8.3–8.5. 
 15  § 30:4D-8.4(c)(3). 
 16  § 30:4D-8.3(a). 
 17  § 30:4D-8.4(b). 
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and gainsharing plans to the State that advance the statutory goals of 
improving “quality and accessibility while reducing or stabilizing the 
costs of medical care throughout a region.”18  To this end, the State is 
only permitted to approve “gainsharing plans that promote: 
improvements in health outcomes and quality of care, as measured by 
objective benchmarks as well as patient experience of care; expanded 
access to primary and behavioral health care services; and the 
reduction of unnecessary and inefficient costs associated with care 
rendered to Medicaid recipients residing in the ACO’s designated 
area.”19  The statute identifies a variety of criteria for the State to 
consider in conducting this review, including whether the plan 
promotes care coordination through multi-disciplinary teams; 
expansion of medical homes; increased patient medication 
adherence; use of health information technology and sharing of 
health information; and use of open-access scheduling.20 
III. ANTITRUST CONCERNS 
Increased regional coordination and shared accountability are 
central to the goals of New Jersey’s demonstration project.  
Collaboration, however, can lead to less competition.21  But a 
commitment to protecting competition is the heart of antitrust law—
a conviction that competition provides consumers with choices that 
can lead to quality and value.22  As then U.S. Assistant Attorney 
General Christine Varney described: 
[t]he ultimate goal of health care reform is to harness the 
power of competition, together with regulation, to expand 
coverage, improve quality, and control the cost of health 
care for all Americans.  The role of antitrust is to ensure 
that competition is preserved and protected, so that it is 
there to be harnessed.23 
 
 18  § 30:4D-8.1(c); see also id. § 30:4D-8.4(c)(4). 
 19  § 30:4D-8.5(d). 
 20  § 30:4D-8.5(b)(1). 
 21  GAO, supra note 1, at 2. 
 22  TAYLOR BURKE ET AL., ALIGNING FORCES FOR QUALITY, HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM 
AND ANTITRUST LAW: THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF HEALTH INFORMATION SHARING BY 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURERS 1 (July 2009), available at 
http://www.stateinnovation.org/Publications/All-Publications/Report-2009-
AligningForcesforQuality-HealthSystemR.aspx.  Although there are three primary 
federal antitrust laws, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7, the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 12–27, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58, Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act is most relevant for purposes of ACO antitrust analysis.   
 23  Christine A. Varney, Remarks as Prepared for the American Bar 
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Thus, although ACOs and antitrust regulation share the goals of 
expanding coverage, improving quality, and controlling costs, aspects 
of the ACO model can raise anti-competitive concerns.  The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) and Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ), as the Federal agencies with 
overlapping authority to enforce the nation’s antitrust laws 
(“Agencies”),24 want to ensure “that coordination and integration 
among health care providers encourage innovation and efficiency 
without harming competition.”25 
There is some concern that the integration that ACOs 
encourage will lead to fewer competitors in the markets, which could 
then increase the market power of ACOs.26  With increased market 
power comes the potential to raise prices to uncompetitive levels.27  
 
Association/American Health Lawyers Association Antitrust in Healthcare 
Conference 3 (May 24, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public 
/speeches/258898.htm (quoted in Ken Glazer & Catherine A. LaRose, Accountable 
Care Organizations: Antitrust Business as Usual, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/dec1
1_glazer_12_21f.authcheckdam.pdf). 
 24  GAO, supra note 1, at 2; MAKING HEALTH REFORM WORK: ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS AND COMPETITION, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 20 n.1 (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/pdf/aco_competition.pdf. 
 25  Antitrust Laws and Their Effects on Healthcare Providers, Insurers and Patients: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2d Sess. (2010), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-157_62658.PDF (testimony 
of Sharis A. Pozen, Chief of Staff and Counsel to the Assistant Att’y Gen. Antitrust 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).  
 26  See Richard M. Sheffler et al., Accountable Care Organizations and Antitrust, 307 
JAMA 1493 (2012); Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable 
Care Organizations and Competition Policy 16 (Aug. 4, 2012) (working paper), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2124097 
[hereinafter “Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers”]; cf. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. 
Trade. Comm’n, Remarks before the North Carolina Bar Assoc’n’s Antitrust and 
Trade Regulation Section 5 (Feb. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/120209nc-cle.pdf (noting that ACOs 
participating in the Federal Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) could 
“interface with the antitrust laws in the future” because “as these integrated groups 
begin to act in the marketplace, they could potentially gain market power and 
reduce competition”). 
 27  Antitrust Issues for Accountable Care Organizations: Revised Agency Guidance 
Spotlights Possible Concerns, ADVISORY (ARNOLD & PORTER LLP) 2, Nov. 2011, available at 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Advisory%20Antitrust_Issues_
Accountable_Care_Organizations_Revised_Agency_Guidance_Spotlights_Possible_C
oncerns.pdf; see generally Austin Frakt, Simply Put: Market Power, INCIDENTAL 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 18, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com 
/wordpress/excerpts-from-health-reform-and-market-competition-by-leibenluft-and-
luft/ (discussing concept of market power for purposes of antitrust law). 
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Even where prices are set by government programs, as they are in 
Medicare and fee-for-service Medicaid,28 and are therefore not subject 
to anticompetitive collusion,29 antitrust regulators may worry about 
the impact of reduced competition on output, quality of services, and 
innovation.30  For example, it could run afoul of antitrust law for 
doctors participating in an ACO to agree to limit business hours or 
restrict access to certain services as a means of cost-savings, or for two 
hospitals to agree that each would specialize in different fields and 
neither would compete with the other in these spheres.31  Similarly, 
the Agencies could object to arrangements among potential 
competitors that reduce consumer choice or lead to a decrease in the 
 
 28  Most New Jersey Medicaid recipients get care through Medicaid managed care 
plans (HMOs) rather than fee-for-service Medicaid.  See STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEP’T 
OF HUMAN SERVS., DIV. OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE & HEALTH SERVS., NJ Medicaid and 
Managed Care, http://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/dmahs/info/resources/care/; 
NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS NEW JERSEY, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 
for Medicaid Clients, 4 (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.naminj.org/advocacy/enews 
/MedicaidClientFAQsAug192011.pdf; THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 
STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, New Jersey: Medicaid Managed Care, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?cat=4&sub=56&rgn=32.  The State 
pays the HMO a capitation rate, and then the HMO negotiates fee levels with 
providers.  See generally CONTRACT BETWEEN STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES AND 
______________________________, CONTRACTOR 3, available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/dmahs/info/resources/care/hmo-
contract.pdf (defining capitation as “a contractual agreement through which a 
contractor agrees to provide specified health care services to enrollees for a fixed 
amount per month”).  If providers were to negotiate their reimbursement rates as a 
block with the HMOs, they could increase their market power and drive prices to 
uncompetitive levels.  Thus, as recommended below, New Jersey should prohibit 
Medicaid HMO providers in an ACO from colluding to set prices with Medicaid 
HMOs.  
 29  See, e.g., Kevin Outterson, Do ACOs with Market Power Need Relaxed Antitrust 
Rules?, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Dec, 2, 2010, 1:00 PM), 
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/do-acos-with-market-power-need-
relaxed-antitrust-rules/ (“Medicare-only ACOs should get a stay-out-of-jail free card 
as well, since the sole customer is a price-fixer.”). 
 30  See BURKE ET AL., supra note 22, at 6; cf. Glazer & LaRose, supra note 23, at 2 
(noting that “although Medicare reimbursements are subject to set fees for services, 
which eliminates the possibility that [a MSSP] ACO might conspire to fix prices for 
various services it provides to beneficiaries, the government will still be alert to anti-
competitive schemes regarding non-price elements of competition”); see generally 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF 
COMPETITION 4 (July 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare 
/040723healthcarerpt.pdf [hereinafter “DOSE OF COMPETITION”] (“Non-price 
competition can promote higher quality and encourage innovation.”). 
 31  Glazer & LaRose, supra note 23, at 7–8. 
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quality of health care.32 
The Agencies also may worry about the impact New Jersey’s 
Medicaid ACOs will have on competition outside of the Medicaid 
markets.  While it does not violate antitrust law for Medicaid ACO 
participants to collectively decide how to divide shared savings earned 
by reducing costs while meeting quality benchmarks, it would raise 
serious antitrust issues if these potential competitors jointly discussed 
contracting outside of the ACO context.33  In addition, the ACO 
arrangement could “make it easier for physicians to exclude potential 
competitors from entry into the local market.”34 
To be sure, aspects of New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO collaborations 
trigger antitrust concerns.  In particular, only one Medicaid ACO is 
permitted in each defined region, and that ACO must have the 
support of all of the hospitals and at least seventy-five percent of the 
primary care providers in that region.35  The Agencies may scrutinize 
New Jersey’s demonstration project to ensure collaboration in the 
Medicaid markets will not reduce quality, innovation, and choice for 
both Medicaid and commercial patients. 
IV. RESPONSES TO ANTITRUST CONCERNS 
New Jersey has strong responses to the antitrust concerns raised 
by its Medicaid ACO pilot project.  For one, collaboration is a means 
to an end—improved quality of care at lower costs.  The pilot 
requires clinical integration to achieve these goals, which, as 
discussed in Section IV.A below, reduces the anticompetitive threat 
from collaboration.  Further, even if the Agencies do not find that 
New Jersey’s Medicaid ACOs are sufficiently clinically integrated to 
balance the threat to competition, the State specifically intended that 
 
 32  Antitrust Issues for Accountable Care Organizations, supra note 27. 
 33  Austin Frakt, Excerpts from “Health Reform and Market Competition,” by Leibenluft 
and Luft, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Oct. 25, 2010), 
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/excerpts-from-health-reform-and-
market-competition-by-leibenluft-and-luft/ (quoting Leibenluft and Luft article). 
 34 Id. 
 35  Cf. Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road, 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2 (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056 
/NEJMp1013404 (warning of the risks of “‘overinclusive’ ACOs . . . composed of an 
unduly large proportion of the hospitals or physicians in their markets” and 
suggesting the federal government not certify ACOs for the MSSP “that are likely to 
inhibit the development of competing ACOs or that will otherwise impede 
competition in the private insurance market,” which, among other things, “would 
constrain large hospitals [in most regions of the country] from forming ACOs with 
rival hospitals”). 
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the state action doctrine would immunize the ACOs’ conduct in 
furtherance of the pilot, as discussed in Section IV.B below.  This 
section reviews the requirements for clinical integration and state 
action immunity and identifies ways New Jersey may structure its 
Medicaid ACOs to mitigate the risks of anticompetitive conduct and 
thus antitrust liability. 
A. Clinical Integration 
Not all collaboration among competitors triggers antitrust 
alarms.36  Indeed, some increased transparency among competitors 
regarding quality and pricing, for example, has the potential to 
increase competition.37  The Agencies have issued guidelines to help 
distinguish which types of collaboration are permissible and which 
pose too great a threat to competition.38 
One form of collaboration among potential competitors that 
may survive an antitrust challenge is when competing health care 
providers clinically integrate their care delivery.  The Agencies have 
recognized that clinical integration of health care providers has the 
potential to result in significant procompetitive efficiencies, such as 
lowering prices or improving quality.39  In the Statements of Antitrust 
 
 36  BURKE ET AL., supra note 22, at 1. 
 37  Id. at 3.  Rather than a problem, some scholars believe integration is “an 
important solution for improving quality and cost in the fee-for-service health 
system.”  David Balto, Sr. Fellow, Ctr. for American Progress, The Need for a New 
Antitrust Paradigm in Health Care, Statements before the H. Judiciary Comm., 
Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy (Dec. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2010/11/pdf/new_antitrust_paradi
gm_healthcare.pdf.  
 38  See, e.g., Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, Dep’t of Justice 
& Fed. Trade Comm’n (Aug. 1996), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines 
/0000.pdf [hereinafter Health Care Statements]; ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf; Letter 
from Fed. Trade Comm’n on TriState Health Partners, Inc. Advisory Op. to Christi J. 
Braun, Esq. (Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter “TriState Health Partners”], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/090413tristateaoletter.pdf; DOSE OF 
COMPETITION, supra note 30, ch. 2, 36–41; Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy 
Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter “MSSP Antitrust 
Statement”]. 
 39  See GAO, supra note 1, at 5–7.  Although financial integration also has 
procompetitive potential, New Jersey’s ACO demonstration project does not include 
financial integration, and thus it is beyond the scope of this Article.  Some states and 
the Federal government are including forms of financial integration in their ACO 
models, such as risk-sharing.  See, e.g., CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES, supra note 2, 
at 6, 13–14 (describing Minnesota’s Medicaid ACO demonstration that includes risk-
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Enforcement Policy in Health Care (“Health Care Statements”), most 
recently updated in 1996, the Agencies broadly described examples 
of activities in which physician joint ventures might engage to 
demonstrate sufficient clinical integration.40  For example, the joint 
venture could implement “an active and ongoing program to 
evaluate and modify practice patterns . . . and create a high degree of 
interdependence and cooperation among the physicians to control 
costs and ensure quality.”41  Specifically, such a program could 
include, for example: 
(1) establishing mechanisms to monitor and control 
utilization of health care services that are designed to 
control costs and ensure quality of care; (2) selectively 
choosing network physicians who are likely to further these 
efficiency objectives; and (3) the significant investment of 
capital, both monetary and human, in the necessary 
infrastructure and capability to realize the claimed 
efficiencies.42 
Through these indicia of clinical integration, the Agencies assess 
whether a joint venture’s structure has the capacity and whether 
individuals participating in the program have sufficient motivation to 
work toward the shared efficiency goals even though there is no 
shared financial risk to incent behavior.43 
The Agencies made clear in the Health Care Statements that the 
examples provided were illustrative and not exhaustive.44  In a recent 
advisory opinion, for example, the FTC also found that the use of 
evidence-based practice guidelines and electronic health records 
constituted evidence of clinical integration.45 
When an arrangement achieves substantial clinical integration 
 
sharing); see generally Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers, supra note 26, at 19 
(noting “that although the FTC has been broadly supportive of efforts to form 
networks relying on clinical integration, some within the agency hold the view that 
financial integration offers a more reliable incentive to produce efficiencies 
necessary to justify enhanced opportunities to exercise market power”).   
 40  See Health Care Statements, supra note 38, at 90–91. 
 41  See id. 
 42  See id. 
 43  See TriState Health Partners, supra note 38, at 15. 
 44  Id. at § B.1, Statement 8. 
 45  GAO, supra note 1, at 12 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADVISORY OPINION FOR 
GREATER ROCHESTER INDEPENDENT PRACTICE ASSOCIATION, INC. (2007)); see also TAYLOR 
BURKE & SARA ROSENBAUM, ALIGNING FORCES FOR QUALITY, ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST POLICY 5 (Mar. 2010), 
https://folio.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/810/57509.pdf?sequence=1 
(summarizing key indicia of clinical integration recognized by the Agencies). 
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such that it is likely to produce significant efficiencies that benefit 
consumers, and when it is reasonably necessary to realize the pro-
competitive benefits of the integration, the Agencies will not presume 
that the agreement is per se illegal.46  Instead, they will apply the rule 
of reason to review the legality of the arrangement: 
A rule of reason analysis evaluates whether the 
collaboration is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if 
so, whether the collaboration’s potential procompetitive 
efficiencies are likely to outweigh those effects.  The greater 
the likely anticompetitive effects, the greater the likely 
efficiencies must be for the collaboration to pass muster 
under the antitrust laws.47 
As its name suggests, reasonableness is at the core of this fact-
intensive analysis. 
The FTC and DOJ recently concluded in a joint Statement of 
Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care 
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program 
(“MSSP Antitrust Statement”) that the eligibility criteria for the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) authorized by the 
Affordable Care Act “are broadly consistent with the indicia of 
clinical integration that the Agencies previously set forth in the 
Health Care Statements” and other agency advice.48  Thus, as Kevin 
Outterson summarized, “[i]f a provider is clinically integrated 
enough to qualify as a Medicare ACO, that’s good enough for 
antitrust law too.”49  As discussed below, the Agencies’ MSSP Antitrust 
Statement is instructive for New Jersey because there are significant 
similarities, albeit some striking differences as well, between New 
Jersey’s Medicaid ACO pilot and the MSSP. 
The MSSP promotes the formation of ACOs serving Medicare 
 
 46  GAO, supra note 1, at 6–8. 
 47  MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,027 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 48  Id.; see generally Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers, supra note 26, at 18 
(describing DOJ and FTC’s MSSP Antitrust Statement as “a modest relaxation of 
antitrust standards previously announced by the agencies”). 
 49  Kevin Outterson, The Substance of the ACO Antitrust Rules, INCIDENTAL 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 29, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com 
/wordpress/the-substance-of-the-aco-antitrust-rules/; see also Greaney, Regulators as 
Market-Makers, supra note 26, at 20 (observing that “the agencies’ deference to 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) regulatory standards [on the 
issue of clinical integration] marks a striking departure from their customary 
practice of evaluating competitive issues based on the specific conditions obtaining 
in individual circumstances and a general aversion to administrative regulation of 
markets”). 
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fee-for-service beneficiaries.50  Like New Jersey Medicaid ACOs, MSSP 
ACOs share a portion of cost savings they realize if the ACO satisfies 
quality performance standards established by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services.51  The MSSP has a number of eligibility 
requirements, including that the ACO have: 
(1) a formal legal structure that allows the ACO to receive 
and distribute payments for shared savings; (2) a leadership 
and management structure that includes clinical and 
administrative processes; (3) processes to promote 
evidence-based medicine and patient engagement; (4) 
reporting on quality and cost measures; and (5) 
coordinated care for beneficiaries.52 
Because organizations that meet the MSSP eligibility 
requirements “are reasonably likely to be bona fide arrangements 
intended to improve the quality, and reduce the costs, of providing 
medical and other health care services through their participants’ 
joint efforts,”53 the Agencies will not presume that joint price 
negotiations or other anticompetitive conduct by these joint ventures 
are per se illegal.  Instead, they 
will treat joint negotiations with private payers as reasonably 
necessary to an ACO’s primary purpose of improving health 
care delivery, and will afford rule of reason treatment to an 
ACO that meets [the MSSP] eligibility requirements for, 
and participates in, the Shared Savings Program and uses 
the same governance and leadership structures and clinical 
and administrative processes it uses in the Shared Savings 
Program to serve patients in commercial markets.54 
Thus, even though the MSSP only involves the Medicare 
markets, the Agencies recognized “that ACOs may generate 
opportunities for health care providers to innovate in both the 
Medicare and commercial markets and achieve for many other 
consumers the benefits Congress intended for Medicare beneficiaries 
 
 50  See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, § 
3022, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-52, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).  
 51  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(B). 
 52  MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,027 (citing The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395–99 
(2010); Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 42 
C.F.R. § 425 (2011)). 
 53  MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,027–28. 
 54  Id. at 67,028. 
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through the [MSSP].”55  Thus, their guidance outlined how health 
care providers could “form procompetitive ACOs that participate in 
both the Medicare and commercial markets.”56 
In doing so, however, the Agencies indicated that they would be 
evaluating data regarding cost, utilization, and quality metrics for 
each MSSP ACO to assess “whether the [MSSP] eligibility criteria 
have required a sufficient level of clinical integration to produce cost 
savings and quality improvements.”57  The Agencies also signaled 
their willingness to consider alternative indicia of clinical 
integration.58 
The most striking difference between the MSSP and New Jersey’s 
Medicaid ACO arguably is market concentration.  The MSSP 
Antitrust Statement established a safety zone for clinically integrated 
MSSP ACOs “that are highly unlikely to raise significant competitive 
concerns and, therefore, will not be challenged by the Agencies 
under the antitrust laws, absent extraordinary circumstances.”59  To 
come within the safety zone, 
independent [MSSP] ACO participants that provide the 
same service (a “common service”) must have a combined 
share of 30 percent or less of each common service in each 
participant’s [primary service area “PSA”], wherever two or 
more [MSSP] ACO participants provide that service to 
patients from that PSA.60 
This is in sharp contrast to New Jersey’s requirement that one 
hundred percent of hospitals and at least seventy-five percent of 
primary care providers in the ACO’s designated area support the 
Medicaid ACO.61  In addition, the MSSP requires that any hospital or 
ambulatory surgery center (ASC) that participates in an MSSP ACO 
 
 55  Id. at 67,026. 
 56 Brill, supra note 26, at 5; accord SHARIS A. POZEN, ACTING ASSISTANT ATT’Y GEN., 
ANTITRUST DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND HEALTH CARE: A PRESCRIPTION 
FOR HIGH QUALITY, AFFORDABLE CARE, REMARKS AS PREPARED FOR THE WORLD ANNUAL 
LEADERSHIP SUMMIT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN HEALTH CARE 16 (Mar. 19, 
2012), available at http://html.documation.com/cds/HEALTH12/Support/PDFs/3-
10.pdf. 
 57  MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,028. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id.  Even MSSP ACOs falling within the safety zone could face antitrust 
challenges based on extraordinary circumstances, “such as collusive behavior or 
exchanges of pricing or other competitively sensitive information with respect to the 
sale of competing services outside the ACO.”  Id. at 67,028 n.24. 
 60  Id. at 67,028.  The Final Antitrust Statement provides additional instructions 
on how to define and calculate PSAs and common services.  Id. 
 61  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.4(c)(3). 
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must be non-exclusive to the ACO to fall within the safety zone, 
regardless of its share of the PSA.62 
The MSSP Antitrust Statement also identifies conduct ACOs 
should avoid to mitigate antitrust concerns.  For one, it recommends 
that all ACOs, regardless of market share or other indications of 
market power, should avoid the “improper exchanges of prices or 
other competitively sensitive information among competing 
participants [that] could facilitate collusion and reduce competition 
in the provision of services outside the ACO.”63 
The Agencies also identified the following four types of conduct 
that ACOs with market shares above the safety zones (or other 
indications of possible market power) may wish to avoid because they 
could raise competitive concerns64: 
(1) Preventing or discouraging private payers from 
directing or incentivizing patients to choose certain 
providers, including providers that do not participate in the 
ACO, through “anti-steering,” “anti-tiering,” “guaranteed 
inclusion,” “most-favored-nation,” or similar contractual 
clauses or provisions. 
(2) Tying sales (either explicitly or implicitly through 
pricing policies) of the ACO’s services to the private payer’s 
purchase of other services from providers outside the ACO 
(and vice versa), including providers affiliated with an ACO 
participant (e.g., an ACO should not require a purchaser to 
contract with all of the hospitals under common ownership 
with a hospital that participates in the ACO). 
(3) Contracting on an exclusive basis with ACO physicians, 
hospitals, ASCs, or other providers, thereby preventing or 
discouraging those providers from contracting with private 
payers outside the ACO, either individually or through 
other ACOs or analogous collaborations. 
(4) Restricting a private payer’s ability to make available to 
 
 62  MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,028–29.  The Final Antitrust 
Statement provides guidance on what it means for an ACO participant to be non-
exclusive to the ACO.  Id. at 67,028.  The Agencies also outlined exceptions to the 
safety zone requirements when an ACO’s PSA share exceeds thirty percent in rural 
areas, or because a dominant provider performs a service that no other MSSP ACO 
participant provides in that PSA.  Id. at 67,029.  These exceptions also include non-
exclusive participation requirements.  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  While these activities could have anticompetitive effects, the Agencies 
recognized that they also could be competitively neutral or even procompetitive, and 
thus the antitrust analysis will depend on the particular facts of the situation.  Id. at 
67,029–30. 
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its health plan enrollees cost, quality, efficiency, and 
performance information to aid enrollees in evaluating and 
selecting providers in the health plan, if that information is 
similar to the cost, quality, efficiency, and performance 
measures used in the Shared Savings Program.65 
Although the MSSP Antitrust Statement does not directly apply 
to New Jersey’s Medicaid ACOs,66 its analytical principles should.  
Consistent with their desire “to maximize and foster opportunities for 
ACO innovation and better health for patients,” the Agencies 
specifically acknowledged that “[t]he analytical principles underlying 
the Policy Statement also would apply to various ACO initiatives 
undertaken by the Innovation Center within [the Center for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services in HHS] as long as those ACOs are 
substantially clinically or financially integrated.”67  While New Jersey’s 
pilot is not sponsored by the Innovation Center, the Agencies have 
indicated that they “support and applaud physicians, hospitals, and 
other providers when they find precompetitive, innovative ways to 
control costs and improve the quality of health care” and 
“encourage[] legitimate endeavors among health care providers to 
improve quality and control costs.”68  Relatedly, in recent interviews 
by the General Accounting Office, Agency officials defended the 
sufficiency of their guidance on clinical integration in part because 
they do not want to be “overly prescriptive.”69  Rather, they 
recognized that there are numerous and evolving ways to clinically 
integrate, and they intentionally “made the guidance sufficiently 
broad to account for new types of clinically integrated collaborative 
arrangements.”70  These comments suggest the Agencies will treat 
New Jersey’s innovative approach to helping its most vulnerable 
patients similarly to how they treat federal pilots and innovations.71 
Applying the principles in the MSSP Antitrust Statement, there 
 
 65  Id. at 67,029 (internal footnote omitted). 
 66  Id. at 67,027. 
 67  Id. at 67,026 & n.7. 
 68  POZEN, supra note 56, at 1–2, 12. 
 69  GAO, supra note 1, at 11.   
 70  Id. at 11–12; see generally A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 30, at 21 
(recommending that private payers, governments, and providers experiment with 
payment methods to align “providers’ incentives with consumers’ interests in lower 
prices, quality improvements, and innovation”). 
 71  See also BURKE & ROSENBAUM, supra note 45, at 5 (observing that “the ACO 
model aligns with longstanding antitrust policies, the aim of which has been to not 
stand in the way of innovative and adequate health care financial and clinical 
integration arrangements”). 
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is a strong basis to conclude that the Agencies will apply rule of 
reason analysis to New Jersey’s demonstration project, as there are a 
number of similarities between the programs.  Both involve 
independent providers collaborating with the goal of improving care 
while reducing costs.  These providers continue to receive 
reimbursement for their services and potentially receive only a 
portion of any shared savings they realize through efficiencies.  Both 
systems require clinical integration to achieve these efficiencies and 
measure quality and patient satisfaction to ensure neither suffers as a 
result of the economic savings.  Indeed, the MSSP eligibility 
requirements, which the Agencies found to be broadly consistent 
with their clinical integration standards, mirror to a large degree 
those that apply to New Jersey Medicaid ACOs.  The New Jersey pilot, 
like the MSSP, requires ACOs to have, among other attributes: (1) 
formal legal structures that allow the ACO to receive and distribute 
payments for shared savings; (2) a leadership and management 
structure that includes clinical and administrative processes; (3) 
processes to promote patient engagement; (4) reporting on quality 
and cost measures; and (5) coordinated care.72  In addition, New 
Jersey’s Medicaid ACOs include a number of features that should 
improve clinical collaboration, such as using electronic health 
records, electronic prescribing, and a range of specialists to address a 
broad range of medical issues.73  Thus, the Agencies should conclude 
that New Jersey Medicaid ACOs warrant rule of reason review because 
they “are reasonably likely to be bona fide arrangements intended to 
improve the quality, and reduce the costs, of providing medical and 
other health care services through their participants’ joint efforts.”74 
There are differences between the programs, however, that may 
impact the rule of reason balancing.  Perhaps the most challenging 
feature of New Jersey’s demonstration project, from an antitrust 
perspective, will be its requirement that all hospitals and at least 
seventy-five percent of primary care providers in the ACO’s defined 
region support the ACO.75  Although the New Jersey law is non-
exclusive to the extent that providers may associate with other ACOs, 
it permits only one Medicaid ACO in each geographic region.76  
Thus, the Medicaid ACO will have one hundred percent of the 
 
 72  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4D-8.4–8.5. 
 73  See §§ 30:4D-8.4(c), 8.5(b). 
 74  MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,027–28 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 75  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.4(c)(3). 
 76  See § 30:4D-8.4(b). 
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hospital market share and at least seventy-five percent of the primary 
care provider market share for Medicaid patients in a designated 
area.  Despite the strong indicia of clinical integration built into New 
Jersey’s design, “even if an arrangement is clinically integrated, it can 
still be condemned under the rule of reason if it has market power.”77  
New Jersey thus should be prepared to demonstrate that its network 
of providers is not over-inclusive. 
New Jersey can respond that the market share requirements in 
its legislation are ancillary to the main goal of improving 
coordination and care while reducing costs.  The Medicaid markets 
in New Jersey are broken.  There are inadequate numbers of 
providers, and there is little to no coordination among them.78  As the 
Camden Coalition of Health Care Providers has maintained, 
Medicaid ACOs make sense for New Jersey because there is a “very 
fragmented provider, hospital, and payer marketplace.  Medicaid 
patients are highly concentrated in urban, impoverished cities, with a 
high percentage covered by government-sponsored health 
plans . . . .”79  There is a strong argument that the market share 
requirements are necessary to bring fragmented providers together 
to try to improve access to and the quality of care while realizing 
efficiencies.80 
 
 77  BURKE & ROSENBAUM, supra note 45, at 7. 
 78  See generally LEGAL SERVS. OF N.J. POVERTY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, POVERTY 
BENCHMARKS 2012: ASSESSING NEW JERSEY’S PROGRESS IN COMBATING POVERTY 88 (May 
2012), available at http://www.lsnj.org/PDFs/budget/Benchmarks2012.pdf 
(“Because [New Jersey Medicaid physician reimbursement] rates are so low, very few 
physicians participate as Medicaid providers.  This means that, while many Medicaid 
recipients theoretically have health care coverage, they practically have no health 
care access.”); Phil Galewitz, Study: Nearly A Third Of Doctors Won’t See New Medicaid 
Patients, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, Aug. 6, 2012, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories 
/2012/august/06/third-of-medicaid-doctors-say-no-new-patients.aspx (reporting that 
a recent survey by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that 
only forty percent of New Jersey office-based physicians will accept new Medicaid 
patients, the lowest rate in the nation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.1(c)(3) (identifying 
among the legislative findings in support of New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO 
demonstration project that “[t]he current health care delivery and payment system 
often fails to provide high quality, cost-effective health care to the most vulnerable 
patients residing in New Jersey, many of whom have limited access to coordinated 
and primary care services and, therefore, tend to delay care, underutilize preventive 
care, seek care in hospital emergency departments or be admitted to hospitals for 
preventable problems”). 
 79  Medicaid ACO Demonstration Projects, CAMDEN COALITION OF HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDERS (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.camdenhealth.org/?s=Medicaid%20ACO 
%20Demonstration%20Projects.  
 80  See generally Sheffler, supra note 26, at 1493  (noting “potential efficiency 
benefits to exclusivity,” such as that “[i]ncreased internal referrals and 
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The State also can emphasize that its Medicaid ACOs will 
develop in geographically contained regions, most likely those that 
have high concentrations of Medicaid patients.  The quality 
measures, if well-crafted in the regulations, should ensure that the 
high market shares do not result in anticompetitive effects on non-
price features of the market, like quality, output, or innovation.  
Although there is the risk of spillover of anticompetitive effects into 
commercial markets, the risk arguably is less than between Medicare 
and commercial markets.  The pilot also is for a limited duration, 
which should cabin anticompetitive risks from this experiment. 
New Jersey should structure its pilot through its regulations to 
account for antitrust concerns.  Thus, it should implement safeguards 
to prevent anticompetitive effects from the ACO’s activities.  As 
suggested by the MSSP Antitrust Statement, the State should limit 
access among and between independent providers to competitively 
sensitive information by, for example, prohibiting collusion over 
price or other competitively sensitive terms and implementing 
firewalls to prevent collusion in the sale of competing services outside 
of the ACO.81  Given the market share of New Jersey Medicaid ACOs, 
the regulations also should prohibit the four types of behavior that 
the Agencies flagged in the MSSP Antitrust Statement as potentially 
anticompetitive, to the extent such behavior is relevant to Medicaid 
markets.82  The State could consider requiring training of ACO 
leadership and staff about antitrust concerns and clarifying how the 
Medicaid ACO will be able to discipline a non-complying provider.  
The State may want to collect data on the commercial markets where 
 
communication among dedicated physicians is expected to facilitate coordinated, 
clinically integrated, and high-quality care”); CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES, supra 
note 2, at 10 (“Other interviewees questioned whether anti-competitive behavior is of 
primary concern within Medicaid, given purchasing dynamics and cost drivers for 
low-income populations.  Given low-levels of Medicaid reimbursement, for-profit, 
high-cost hospitals and health systems may be less likely to serve Medicaid 
beneficiaries in the first place.  Patterns of high, inappropriate hospital and 
emergency department utilization are likely the biggest driver of avoidable Medicaid 
costs, rather than high per-unit costs.  Collaboration among providers may be more 
effective in solving what is fundamentally a utilization issue related to unmet health 
and social needs, not a cost issue.”).  Cf. S. 1580 § 20, 76th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Or. 2012), available at https://cco.health.oregon.gov/Documents/sb1580.intro.pdf 
(permitting more than one coordinated care organization to serve a geographic area 
if necessary to optimize access and choice). 
 81 See MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,029 (Oct. 28, 2011); 
BURKE, supra note 22, at 12.  
 82  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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ACOs operate to monitor for evidence of anticompetitive spillover.83  
In general, the State should endeavor to implement an “active and 
ongoing program to evaluate and modify practice patterns by the 
[ACO]’s providers and to create a high degree of interdependence 
and cooperation among the providers to control costs and ensure 
quality.”84 
Given the clear legislative intent behind the Medicaid ACO 
demonstration to encourage clinical integration in the name of 
quality improvement at reduced costs, it seems likely that the 
Agencies will find that the procompetitive advantages to consumers 
of New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO pilot outweigh its potential harm to 
competition, and that the anticompetitive aspects of the 
collaboration are necessary to realize its benefits.  The result of the 
rule of reason analysis may well depend on how New Jersey structures 
its pilot in forthcoming regulations.  New Jersey should use this 
opportunity to craft its regulations, ideally with Agency input, to 
make it more likely and verifiable that procompetitive effects 
dominate, which may convince the Agencies that Medicaid ACOs are 
a worthy innovation that they want to encourage. 
B. State Action Doctrine 
Even if the Medicaid ACO does not survive antitrust scrutiny 
under the rule of reason analysis, New Jersey specifically intended to 
extend its state action immunity from federal antitrust law to its 
Medicaid ACOs.85  Other states also are invoking this doctrine to 
protect ACOs from federal antitrust challenges.86 
 
 83  Cf., e.g., Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers, supra note 26, at 28, 29 
(noting that several commenters on the MSSP Proposed Rule suggested “ways to 
improve detection and analysis of competitive conditions such as collaborative data 
collection by CMS and the antitrust agencies, mandating public reporting on the cost 
and price of care, and close monitoring of provider pricing in commercial markets” 
and suggesting “CMS could make more explicit that it is likely to deny renewal of 
authority for ACOs to participate in the MSSP where it finds evidence of spillovers in 
the form of price increases and cost shifting to the private sector resulting from 
market power”). 
 84  MSSP Antitrust Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,027; see, e.g., H.B. 3650, 76th 
Leg. Assemb. (Or. 2011) (may not “solicit, share, or discuss pricing information” at 
joint survey or meetings); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.420 (West 2009) (may not 
agree “among competing health care providers or health carriers as to the price or 
specific level of reimbursement for health care services”). 
 85  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.1(g); see generally CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE STRATEGY, 
supra note 2, at 5 (noting that “anti-trust issues in Medicaid may be easier [than in 
the MSSP context] due to the state-action doctrine”). 
 86  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.735(1) (West 2011) (declaring legislative 
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A state and its officers and agents generally are not subject to 
federal antitrust liability when they act to implement state legislation, 
even when their actions have anticompetitive effects.87  This immunity 
from antitrust liability, often referred to as the Parker immunity 
doctrine, is based on principles of federalism and applies when the 
state is acting as a sovereign, but not when it is a mere “participant in 
a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade.”88 
Federalism concerns, however, do not reach private actors.  
Thus, where private actors seek shelter from antitrust liability for 
their involvement in a state regulatory scheme, courts require proof 
that the private actors are acting at the behest of the state and not 
simply as a result of private, anticompetitive agreements.  The 
Supreme Court has a created a “state action doctrine” to define 
circumstances in which private market participants are shielded from 
federal antitrust laws for otherwise questionable conduct undertaken 
pursuant to a state regulatory scheme.  Specifically, the Supreme 
Court has identified two elements that must be satisfied before 
private actors may invoke immunity from antitrust liability.  First, the 
state must articulate a clear and affirmative policy to allow the 
anticompetitive conduct to ensure that the state’s goals, and not 
simply self-serving goals, are furthered.89  Second, the state must 
provide active supervision of anticompetitive conduct undertaken by 
private actors.90  Given that the doctrine permits anticompetitive 
behavior that otherwise would violate federal policy, it is not 
surprising that its application is disfavored.91 
 
intent to provide immunity from federal antitrust laws to coordinated care 
organizations through the state action doctrine); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.420 
(West 2011); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2959-a (McKinney 2011) (establishing multi-
payer patient centered medical home program with state action immunity); NY CLS 
Pub. Health § 2999-r (adopting state action immunity for ACO demonstration); see 
generally PURINGTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 8–9 (noting that Vermont and 
Washington included language in legislative ACO proposals to provide antitrust 
protection to participants); BURKE, supra note 22, at 8–12 (summarizing health-
related legislation in various states that relies on the state action doctrine). 
 87  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (finding no congressional intent 
for the federal antitrust laws “to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities 
directed by its legislature”); see also FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 632–33 
(1992) (stating that “federal antitrust laws are subject to supersession by state 
regulatory programs”). 
 88  Parker, 317 U.S. at 351–52. 
 89  California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980). 
 90  Id. 
 91  Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 636; see generally DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra 
note 30, at 28 (warning that “[i]nappropriately broad interpretations” of the state 
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Applying the state action doctrine to New Jersey’s demonstration 
project, it is likely that New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO legislation satisfies 
the first element of the state action test.  The Legislature specifically 
exempted private Medicaid ACO participants from State antitrust 
liability and expressed its intent for private participants to enjoy 
immunity from federal antitrust liability “through the state action 
doctrine.”92  Whether private participants in New Jersey’s regulatory 
scheme will enjoy federal antitrust immunity therefore will depend 
on the second element: whether the State actively supervises, through 
mechanisms included in the State’s statute and forthcoming 
regulations, the potentially anticompetitive private conduct. 
As the Supreme Court of the United States has explained, the 
active supervision requirement “requires that state officials have and 
exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private 
parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.”93  By 
requiring the state to exercise sufficient independent judgment and 
control, courts ensure that private actors advance the state’s 
regulatory agenda and not simply their private interests.  “Immunity 
is conferred out of respect for ongoing regulation by the State, not 
out of respect for the economics of price restraint.”94 
What does not satisfy the active supervision requirement is 
clearer from case law than what does.  It is not enough for the state to 
have a veto over private agreements or just to check the math on the 
private conduct.95  Nor is it sufficient for the state to have the ability 
to supervise the private conduct if it does not actually engage in 
active supervision.  The state also may not rely on state judicial review, 
at least where the court cannot reach the merits of the private 
action.96  It likely is insufficient for the state to passively review 
contracts among competitors, especially if the system for state review 
essentially establishes “a presumption in favor of approval.”97 
Rather, the state must get into the “specific details” of the private 
behavior; “[a]ctual state involvement, not deference to private 
 
action doctrine can “chill or limit competition in health care markets”). 
 92  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.1(g). 
 93  Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S at 634 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 94  Id. at 633. 
 95  Id. at 638. 
 96  Id. at 638–39. 
 97  BURKE, supra note 22, at 11 (quoting FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, IN RE MINNESOTA 
HOUSE BILL H.F. NO. 120 & SENATE BILL S.F. NO. 203 ADVISORY OPINION (Mar. 18, 
2009), http://www.ftc/opp/advocacy/V090003.pdf). 
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[anticompetitive] arrangements under the general auspices of state 
law, is the precondition for immunity from federal law.”98  The 
development and administration of Medicaid ACOs may involve 
cooperation among entities that are otherwise competitors in matters 
such as business practices and referrals.  The cases reviewing the state 
action doctrine as applied to some types of potential anticompetitive 
behavior provide an indication as to the degree of state oversight 
courts will expect of states in the supervision of other types of 
behavior. 
While the Supreme Court to date has not identified specific 
procedural or substantive standards that states must adopt to satisfy 
the active supervision requirement,99 the FTC has identified three 
elements that it will evaluate in deciding whether the active 
supervision prong has been satisfied in a given case: 
(1) Development of an adequate factual record, including 
notice and opportunity to be heard. 
(2) A written decision on the merits. 
(3).“[A] specific assessment—both qualitative and 
quantitative—of how the private action comports with the 
substantive standards established by the state legislature.”100 
Although the Supreme Court has not adopted these elements, the 
FTC regularly applies them;101 it would be prudent, then, to anticipate 
that these elements will guide evaluation of applications of the state 
action doctrine. 
In fleshing out the substance of these requirements, the FTC 
requires that states engage in a “‘pointed re-examination’ of the 
private conduct”: 
 
 98  Id. 
 99  Supreme Court guidance may be forthcoming because, for the first time in 
nearly twenty years, the Court will hear a case this term that concerns the scope of 
the state action doctrine, this time in the hospital merger context.  See Fed. Trade 
Comm’n  v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4852, 80 U.S.L.W. 3707 
(Jun. 25, 2012); Questions Presented, 11-1160 Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe 
Putney Health System, Inc., http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-01160qp.pdf. 
 100  TODD J. ZYWICKI ET AL., OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE 
ACTION TASK FORCE 55 (Sept. 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf. 
 101 See In re N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343 (F.T.C. Nov. 
20, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9343/110208commopinion 
.pdf (noting that “[a]lthough no single one of these elements is necessarily a 
prerequisite for active supervision, the Board has presented no evidence that any of 
these elements are satisfied here” and that the Sixth Circuit affirmed the FTC’s 
application of these elements in Kentucky Household Goods Carriers Ass’n v. FTC, 199 F. 
App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
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One asserting the state action defense must demonstrate 
that the state agency has ascertained the relevant facts, 
examined the substantive merits of the private action, 
assessed whether that private action comports with the 
underlying statutory criteria established by the state 
legislature, and squarely ruled on the merits of the private 
action in a way sufficient to establish the challenged 
conduct as a product of deliberate state intervention rather 
than private choice.102 
Developing an adequate factual record facilitates this pointed re-
examination.  Thus, the FTC has emphasized the need for the state 
to obtain “reliable, timely, and complete” data to permit the state to 
evaluate if the private conduct is furthering the Legislative 
objectives.103  The FTC similarly has emphasized the need for the state 
to conduct periodic reviews of ongoing private conduct with updated 
data and not just to permit an initial approval to justify continued 
immunity.104 In the FTC’s view, providing notice and an opportunity 
to comment to affected communities is integral to this process of 
assembling the factual record.  As the FTC has stated, “[t]hese 
procedural elements . . . are powerful engines for ensuring that 
relevant facts—especially those facts that might tend to contradict the 
proponent’s contentions—are brought to the state decisionmaker’s 
attention.”105  It is noteworthy that the FTC on several occasions has 
criticized a proposed regulatory scheme for not permitting the state 
to require submission of additional information needed to facilitate 
pointed re-examination.106 
The FTC also places high value on the state supervisor issuing a 
 
 102  ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT IN IND. 
HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMEN, INC., FILE NO. 021-0115, at 4 (F.T.C. Apr. 5, 
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/indianahouseholdmoversanalysis 
.pdf [hereinafter “IND. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMAN ANALYSIS OF 
PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER”]. 
 103  Id. at 6. 
 104  Id. at 6; see also Letter from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Elliott Naishtat, Rep., Tex. H.R.et al.  (May 18, 2011), 
available at http://html.documation.com/cds/HEALTH12/Support/PDFs/7-1.pdf 
(noting lack of required review after health care cooperative’s first year in finding 
party seeking immunity had not carried heavy burden). 
 105  IND. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMAN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT 
ORDER, supra note 102, at 7. 
 106  See, e.g., Letter from Joseph J. Simons, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n on Alaska S.B. 37 to Lisa Murkowski, Chair, H. Labor & Commerce 
Comm., Alaska H.R. (Jan. 18, 2002), available at www.ftc.Gov/be/v020003.htm 
[hereinafter “FTC Letter on Alaska S.B. 37”]. 
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written decision.  As it has explained, “[t]hough not essential, the 
existence of a written decision is normally the clearest indication that 
the [state entity] (1) genuinely has assessed whether the private 
conduct satisfies the legislature’s stated standards and (2) has directly 
taken responsibility for that determination.”107  Whether the state is 
approving or denying proposed private anticompetitive conduct, the 
FTC favors a written decision that provides “analysis and reasoning, 
and supporting evidence [regarding whether] the private conduct 
furthers the legislature’s objectives.”108 
Whether reduced to writing or not, the FTC’s third active 
supervision element looks for a qualitative and quantitative 
assessment by the state in considering whether to approve the private 
anticompetitive conduct.  The FTC looks for evidence of the “steps 
the State took in analyzing” the proposed private conduct and “the 
criterion it used in evaluating” that proposed conduct.109  Among the 
evidence the FTC will consider is “whether the State independently 
verified the accuracy of financial data submitted and whether it relied 
on accurate and representative samples of data. There should be 
evidence that the State has a thorough understanding of the 
consequences of the private parties’ proposed action.”110  The FTC 
also looks for evidence that the state reviewed “particular contracts 
and fee arrangements . . . to assess whether they comport with State 
policy goals . . . and to remedy on an ongoing basis situations that 
may violate those goals.”111  This type of review can be rather 
intensive, and the FTC often expresses its concern that states lack the 
requisite resources and time to complete the hands-on oversight 
necessary.112  For example, it has criticized proposals imposing thirty- 
and ninety-day time periods for state review, noting that they did not 
permit the state to extend the time for good cause.113 
 
 107  IND. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMAN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT 
ORDER, supra note 102, at 7. 
 108  Id.; see also Letter from Joseph. J. Simons, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n on Ohio H.B. 325 to Dennis Stapleton, Chairman, Ins. Comm., Ohio 
H.R. (Oct. 16, 2002), available at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/ohb325.htm. 
 109  IND. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMAN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT 
ORDER, supra note 102, at 8. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Letter from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n to Senators Eric D. Coleman & John A. Kissel, Representatives Gerald Fox 
and John W. Hetherington, Conn. Gen. Assemb. (June 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/06/110608chc.pdf. 
 112  Id. 
 113  See, e.g., Letter to Lisa Murkowski, supra note 106; Letter from Susan DeSanti, 
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New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO legislation expressly intends for the 
State to have oversight over Medicaid ACOs and builds features of 
State oversight into the statute.  Proposed ACOs must apply to the 
State Department of Human Services (DHS) “for certification and 
participation in the project,” and DHS must “consult with the 
Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS) with respect to 
establishment and oversight of the demonstration project.”114  DHS is 
empowered to deny certification to any applicant that it determines 
does not meet the various statutory eligibility requirements.115  Once 
certified, a Medicaid ACO must further seek DHS approval of its 
gainsharing plan before it may receive and distribute any shared 
savings.116  The statute requires DHS, with input from DHSS, to obtain 
and review data, including patient experience of care, and consider 
various criteria in deciding whether to approve an ACO’s gainsharing 
plan, which include substantive standards as well as whether the plan 
was “developed with community input and will be made available for 
inspection by members of the community served by the ACO.”117  The 
statute also empowers DHS to approve amendments to an ACO’s 
gainsharing plan.118  The State is further charged with responsibility 
for designing and implementing the ACO application process, 
collecting data from ACO participants, and approving a methodology 
for calculating cost savings and monitoring health outcomes and 
quality of care under the pilot.119  Each year, DHS, in consultation 
with DHSS, shall evaluate the pilot to assess whether there are cost 
savings and improvement in the rates of health screening, the 
outcomes and hospitalization rates for persons with chronic illnesses, 
and the hospitalization and readmission rates.120  At the completion 
of the three-year demonstration project, DHS and DHSS shall 
provide an evaluation of the pilot to the Governor and to the 
Legislature, including an assessment of whether it should be made a 
permanent program.121  The statute further directs DHS, with input 
 
supra note 111. 
 114  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.3(a). 
 115  § 30:4D-8.4. 
 116  §§ 30:4D-8.5(a) & § 30:4D-8.7(a). 
 117  § 30:4D-8.5(b) & (h). 
 118  § 30:4D-8.5(a). 
 119  § 30:4D-8.8(a). 
 120  § 30:4D-8.9; cf. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 848.060 (West 2011) (requiring 
annual renewal of health care collaborative certificate of authority and 
determination of approval). 
 121  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-8.14. 
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from DHSS, to promulgate regulations establishing, among other 
things, “the standards for gainsharing plans submitted by Medicaid 
ACOs . . . [and] governing the ongoing oversight and monitoring of 
the quality of care delivered to Medicaid recipients in the designated 
areas served by the Medicaid ACOs.”122 
While the statute establishes a framework for State oversight of 
the demonstration project, it may not be sufficient to satisfy the 
demanding state action standards.  Based on the Agency guidance 
reviewed above, there are a number of issues for the State to consider 
as it finalizes draft regulations to implement the Medicaid ACO pilot.  
A high priority is addressing the need for ongoing monitoring and 
oversight.  Although the statute requires annual review of the 
program as a whole, it does not expressly require ongoing review of 
each ACO’s continued eligibility and compliance with the pilot’s 
objectives.123  The State needs to be able to monitor the performance 
of ACOs after they are certified and their gainsharing plans are 
approved or amended to ensure that they continue to comply with 
the program’s objectives.  To facilitate this oversight, for example, the 
State could require ACOs to report annually on the amount, 
distribution, and use of savings achieved; quality performance 
measures; and patient satisfaction reports.  This oversight could keep 
an eye on whether there have been any anticompetitive spillover 
effects into other markets from the ACO’s activities.  The State may 
also want to impose an ongoing obligation on ACOs to notify the 
State in a timely fashion if they experience any material changes from 
what they represented in their applications or gainsharing plans so 
the State, as overseer, can evaluate whether these changes affect the 
ACO’s eligibility for the pilot. 
The state action doctrine not only requires the State to review 
the actions of non-state actors, but it also must disapprove of 
anticompetitive private party conduct that fails to comply with State 
policy.124  The statute is not clear, however, whether the State has any 
option other than to approve or disapprove ACO applications and 
gainsharing plans.125  The State should clarify the bases on which and 
at what points it may take action if a participant or ACO is not 
complying with the program’s requirements.  For example, the State 
 
 122  § 30:4D-8.15. 
 123  § 30:4D-8.9. 
 124  See supra note 93 and accompanying text (quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 
504 U.S. 621, 634 (1992)). 
 125  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4D-8.4(a), 8.5(b). 
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may consider whether and in what circumstances it may suspend or 
revoke a previously granted certification, impose a remediation plan, 
require reapplication, and/or reconsider a previous decision. 
Although not necessarily required to, the State also may wish to 
adopt some or all of the three factors that the FTC has said it will 
consider when analyzing if the active supervision prong has been 
satisfied.126  To ensure that it develops an adequate factual record, the 
State could require applicants to submit information it will need to 
perform qualitative and quantitative assessments, which may include, 
for example, information regarding the ACO’s contracts and fee 
arrangements and copies of the ACO’s certificate of incorporation 
and bylaws.  At a minimum, the State should include language giving 
it the authority to require applicants to provide additional 
information needed to perform its oversight functions.  Although the 
statute contemplates some opportunity for the public to have notice 
of and to comment on ACO formation, the State could clarify what 
stages of the ACO formation and approval processes require notice 
and comment from the public and how the process will work at each 
stage. 
The State also should decide whether to require any of its 
decisions regarding Medicaid ACOs to be in writing, such as its 
decisions regarding the ACO’s application for certification, 
gainsharing plan, amendment of the plan, and, if implemented, 
annual review of the ACO’s certification.  It also would be useful for 
the State to require any decision to articulate the reasons and 
supporting evidence for its conclusion. 
To demonstrate that the State performs a qualitative and 
quantitative assessment of the private conduct, the regulations could 
require the State to independently verify and analyze the information 
supplied by the ACOs.  The regulations also could address how, 
logistically, the State will implement its oversight obligations.  For 
example, it could establish the time frames for each stage in the 
process.  In doing so, the State will have to balance the desire to keep 
the ACO certification process moving swiftly with both the reality of 
limited State resources and the Agencies’ skepticism that the State 
can meaningfully fulfill an oversight function in limited time frames.  
The regulations could permit the State to extend the time periods for 
good cause. 
While there are a variety of options available to the State to 
 
 126  See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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improve the chances that the Agencies and, ultimately the courts, will 
find that the state action doctrine applies, it is unclear how much the 
State must do to satisfy the active supervision requirement.  It is 
notable that the vast majority of available FTC guidance on this prong 
involves fact patterns that are distinguishable from Medicaid ACOs 
and much more akin to classic price fixing, like doctors seeking to 
band together to renegotiate fee schedules or movers collectively 
setting rates.127  It is an open question how the FTC and DOJ will 
apply these standards to New Jersey’s demonstration project.  As 
discussed above, the Federal government has signaled its support of 
similar programs that look to bend the cost curve by improving 
quality while trimming costs.  The pilot includes quality measures and 
consumer input, which should facilitate State oversight.128  Thus, to 
the extent possible, New Jersey should seek input from the Agencies 
during the regulatory drafting process to inform its decisions about 
how to structure its oversight of the pilot. 
V. CONCLUSION 
New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO Demonstration Project raises 
significant federal antitrust issues.  But it also proposes an innovative 
reform that seeks to increase access to better quality health care for 
vulnerable populations while reducing costs.  The federal antitrust 
Agencies share these goals and have committed to working with 
innovators to test these proposals.  As Sharis A. Pozen, former Acting 
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division, recently said, 
“[t]he ultimate objective is that ACOs and ACO participants commit 
to the necessary changes in leadership, management, and clinical 
structures and procedures that will lead to real cost containment and 
quality improvements.”129  New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO pilot 
challenges providers and the community to make this commitment.  
 
 127  See, e.g., FTC Letter on Alaska S.B. 37, supra note 106 (commenting on State 
bill seeking to permit “competing physicians to engage in collective bargaining with 
health plans over fees and other terms”); IND. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND 
WAREHOUSEMAN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER, supra note 102 (involving 
allegations that an association of seventy movers in Indiana established collective 
rates for the transportation of household goods within the State that were agreed 
upon by all of its members). 
 128  Cf. GAO, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining that a “key reason” that the MSSP 
safety zone is more generous than in the 1996 Health Care Statements was that, 
“unlike collaborative arrangements in the private market, ACOs in the [M]SSP are 
subject to quality and cost reporting requirements and monitoring that do not exist 
for arrangements outside this program”). 
 129  POZEN, supra note 56, at 17. 
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New Jersey should work with the FTC and DOJ to structure its 
Medicaid ACO Demonstration Project to minimize the threat of 
anticompetitive conduct while maximizing these shared goals. 
 
